A. R. Zolberg. “The Next Waves: Migration Theory for a Changing World.”

a.       GLOBAL INEQUALITY

                                                  i.      Global population increase and decline of subsistence economies, plus lower transportation costs, mean more people will move

                                                ii.      Most people will move within their own countries, but some may relocate abroad

                                              iii.      Migration destinations will be determined by geographical proximity as well as political and economic linkages and migrant networks

                                              iv.      Border control is an effective tool for controlling the extent of migration between countries

b.      BORDERS AS BARRIERS TO MOVEMENT

                                                  i.      Classical migration theory omits the effect of border controls on migrant flows; this dates back to Ravenstein’s 1889 work

                                                ii.      In reality, migration “entails not only physical relocation, but a change of jurisdiction and membership” (p. 406)

                                              iii.      Few states restrict the exit of their citizens; all states restrict entry of new migrants

1.      This means that the policies of the receiving countries determine what kind of migration can take place

2.      International migration policy is therefore characterized by “disincentives” instead of “incentives” (Bhagwati 1984)

3.      This applies to refugees as well, who can only flee their home if there is another country to welcome them

                                              iv.      The system of border controls preserves global inequality and allows receiving states to admit only migrants considered desirable

c.       EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOR

                                                  i.      Classical migration theory looks at immigration as the aggregate movement of individuals seeking new opportunities, while modern migration theory sees a movement of workers propelled by the “push/pull” dynamics of the capitalist system

                                                ii.      The Kennedy-Johnson immigration reforms in the U.S. in the 1960s imposed a set limit for immigration from the Western Hemisphere, driving migration between the U.S. and Latin America underground and leading to greater exploitation of workers

                                              iii.      Portes (1978) linked migration and dependency, noting that Latin America’s dependence on the U.S. created structural distortions that exacerbated “push” conditions and triggered migration networks

                                              iv.      In Europe, guestworker programs (similar to U.S.’s bracero program) linked admission and residence to economic performance, and served as a buffer to slow population growth

1.      The purely economic function of this migration allowed the development of an institutional or a Marxist approach to understanding European migration in the mid-1900s

                                                v.      Understanding migration as benefitting capitalists begs the question why haven’t they advocated for open borders; they haven’t because unions protect native workers from labor importation and because workers and capitalists have shared interests as native taxpayers in keeping migrants away from state resources

                                              vi.      There will continue to be a need for low-skill immigrant labor in the “core” despite industry moving to the “periphery,” as low-skill labor in the services sector may replace this

                                            vii.      Economic reasons are not the only grounds for opposing immigration; restrictions are also implemented to “minimize the growing social tensions created by the presence of a large number of foreigners” (OECD 1979)

                                          viii.      Institutionalized racism, created to separate European colonizers from their colonial subjects, renders migrants both suitable as labor and undesirable in society; cultural and political differences also compound the problems of accepting migrants in liberal democracies

                                              ix.      The idea of “membership” is broadening to include members of international communities (like the European Community, and the U.S.-Canadian trade partnership) as well as groups sharing ancestral origins (volksdeutsche in Germany, Jews in Israel)

d.      LIBERALIZATION OF EXIT FROM THE SOCIALIST WORLD

                                                  i.      The USSR viewed emigration as a potential threat, as those who went abroad were assumed to join other enemies abroad; this opinion was shared by other totalitarian regimes in the 20^th century

                                                ii.      Emigration may be seen as “voting with one’s feet” and thus poses a challenge for regimes that claim to rest on democratic principles

                                              iii.      The West’s acceptance of Communist “defectors” was mostly for show, as few people could actually leave, and was highly racialized as Asian defectors were not welcomed in the same way

                                              iv.      The article predicts relaxation of exit policies as glasnost and perestroika take off; this could lead to a reduction of propaganda value in welcoming “defectors” and cause them to be treated like ordinary migrants

e.       THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

                                                  i.      Mid-1970s saw massive refugee movements in Asia and Africa, as well as Latin America’s Southern Cone; by the end of the 1980s, an estimated 18.5 million people were refugees living abroad, with millions more living as internally displaced persons

                                                ii.      The rise in refugee population coincided with the 1970s economic slump, causing most wealthy countries to tighten their refugee and asylum policies; this caused most refugees to remain in camps in neighboring countries, aided only by UNHCR

                                              iii.      The refugee crisis is rarely a result of ordinary war between sovereign states, but can be seen as a by-product of the formation of new states and confrontations over the social order

f.       FORMATION OF NEW STATES IN ASIA AND AFRICA

                                                  i.      Colonial wars of independence produced refugees and displaced people (especially European colonizers who returned “home” to Europe), but “all possible cases have already surfaced and reached a definitive outcome”

                                                ii.      Ethnic diversity can be a cause of conflict and produce refugees, but is not the primary cause as is widely believed

1.      Instead, the disruption of the balance of power among various ethnic groups caused by the worldwide financial crisis can be seen as the source of conflict and refugee displacement in Asia and Africa

                                              iii.      “Ethnic hierarchies” are particularly explosive structures wherein social class and ethnic membership coincide; members of groups in unfavorable positions within the ethnic hierarchy may use their networks to go abroad, or may be expelled from the country

                                              iv.      Regional concentrations of groups exacerbate conflicts over power and resources; this often leads to separatist movements, with the international system favoring the government and irredentist movements favoring the secessionists; these separatist movements in turn may cause people to flee from the violence

g.      CONFLICTS OVER THE SOCIAL ORDER

                                                  i.      Conflicts over the social order involve a struggle between dominant and subordinate classes leading to revolution; revolutions (attempted and successful) in Africa, Asia, and Latin America since the end of WWII have produced major international population movements

                                                ii.      Revolutions produce refugees by generalized violence and dislocation; the ruling elite may flee in fear of retribution (“anticipatory refugee movement”); and a larger refugee flow may follow of those individuals negatively affected by the post-revolution reconstruction

                                              iii.      Land-based dictatorships (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala) often have simmering conflicts and popular rebellions which generate migrant flows seeking to escape both the violence and the poor socioeconomic conditions, allowing receiving states to question whether they are “genuine” refugees

                                              iv.      Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in mid-range economies typically generate a trickle of activist exiles rather than large migrant flows; however the fascist “national security states” of the Southern Cone in Latin America and Brazil in the 1970s were an exception

                                                v.      The amalgam of small-scale societies, as in Africa, may lead to structural instability, coups, and localized popular protest, which can produce migrant flows if protests occur near national borders; the violence may feed on itself and lead to the emergence of a warlord system, as well as massive deaths

                                              vi.      Détente among superpowers after the Cold War will likely reduce future conflicts producing refugees, but structural issues in Africa and Asia will persist in displacing persons, and the tighter asylum laws in developed countries will mean most refugees continue to live in camps in neighboring poor countries

h.      CONCLUSION

                                                  i.      “Given the persistence of huge disparities of conditions among rich and poor countries, the pool of potential international migrants will continue to grow; and since the affluent countries have erected a collective protective wall, we should anticipate a rise in ‘north-south’ tensions over the issue of migration, leading to demands for inclusion of more equitable arrangements within the ‘new international order’” (p. 423)

                                                ii.      Therefore, Westerners should be concerned with aiding the mass of refugees confined in the developing world and with altering the admissions policies of capitalist democracies

                                              iii.      Economics suggest that immigration may or may not benefit both sending and/or receiving countries; liberal states may attempt to “protect” their citizens by focusing their admissions policies on family reunification and asylum for refugees, as in the U.S. immigration laws of the 1980s

1.      This policy is a more “national” approach as favor is shown to migrants from already-established groups, such as Irish, Italian and Polish migrants in the U.S.

                                              iv.      Alternatively, a “cosmopolitan” approach would admit only migrants shown to be essential to the system of equal basic liberties

                                                v.      Gibney (1986) suggests reordering admissions criteria based on the “Harm Principle” whereby those harmed abroad deserve restitution, and the “Basic Rights Principle” whereby nations are obliged to meet the basic needs of individuals from all societies, regardless of whether or not they caused the harm

1.      This would reorder U.S. immigration policy, which currently favors family reunification, Communist defectors, and labor migrants

2.      The new admission preference would be given to those harmed abroad by U.S. foreign policy (eg, Chileans under Pinochet) and those whose admission would meet a fair share of the “basic needs” of refugees worldwide